Competition among universities: The role of preferences for research and government finance by Elena del Rey
Competition among universities: The role of preferences






We build on previous results to explore the effect of student mobility on university behaviour. Our results suggest
that, if universities do not care for research, they do not react to increased competition when students are able to
choose where to study. Further, neither do they react to the incentives provided by the government through the finan-
cing scheme. Preferences for research thus turn out to be the key element for success of policies which aim at (i) en-
hancing competition in the higher education sector and (ii) affecting resulting levels of education quality and re-
search through incentives provided by the financing scheme.
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1. Introduction
Much is expected from the introduction of competitive forces in the domain of publicly
provided higher education. Even those who do not challenge the principle that higher educa-
tion must be publicly financed, advocate student mobility as a means to enhance competition
among universities. If students can choose which university to attend, universities will be-
have strategically in order to attract students, thus raising education quality.
Or will they? Our analysis suggests that only if universities care sufficiently for research
will student mobility have an effect on their behaviour. Moreover, competition may allow
the government to induce the desired levels of teaching, education quality and research by
means of a very simple tool: the relative weight of per-student allocations in the funding
scheme. Information about number of enrolments is easier to obtain than information about
research output or education quality. For this reason, per-student allocations, actually widely
used in Europe as a way to finance schools and universities, can be an invaluable tool.
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two publicly financed universities competing for students in the same jurisdiction. In doing
so, this work put together three elements of higher education provision that appear separately
in previous literature about university behaviour: the trade-off between teaching and re-
search (Garvin, 1980; Boroah, 1994), the competition among universities (Gary-Bobo and
Trannoy, 1998b; Debande and Demeulemeester, 1998) and the role of the incentives pro-
vided by the government (Gary-Bobo and Trannoy, 1998a,b). The model considers two iden-
tical universities that care for research as well as the increase in productivity of students
through education. The education production function is assumed to depend on student's av-
erage ability as well as resources devoted to teaching. Finally, universities are funded by the
government by means of a lump-sum amount and a per-student allocation.
The resulting equilibrium is unique and symmetric but can take four different shapes de-
pending on preferences for research, the technology of the education production function and
the relative weight between the two components of the finance scheme. The four equilibrium
types are:
1. Full-time teaching.
2. Selective teaching and research.
3. Mass teaching and research.
4. Full-time research.
The aim of this note is to compare our previous results with the outcome of university
behaviour in absence of student mobility. By doing this, we shall be able to isolate the role of
competition on university behaviour as well as the conditions for it to take place.
We obtain the following result: in absence of student mobility, universities devote all
their time/resources to either teaching or research. Therefore, equilibrium types 2 and 3 will
only result in presence of student mobility. Further, neither of these mixed equilibrium types
results if preferences for research are not strong. As a result, we may conclude that, for stu-
dent mobility to have an effect on higher education, we need universities to have strong pref-
erences for research. On the other hand, we will show that both student mobility and strong
preferences for research are necessary conditions for universities to react to changes in the
funding scheme.
This note is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly introduce the model and solve
it, comparing the outcome to our previous results. In Section 3, we conclude.
2. The model
We consider the model specified in Del Rey (2001) and assume that, now, students are
assigned by law to their closest university. This way, demand is given by the student popula-
tion within each jurisdiction. As a result, no interaction among the universities takes place.
The aim of this note is precisely to compare the outcome of university behaviour in a com-
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strategic interaction.
The model is then as follows: there are two identical universities i = 1,2. Students differ
in ability a and in location x, which are uniformly and independently distributed on
[0,1]  [0,1]. Since students do not choose university, demand for university i = 1,2 is exoge-
nous and equals one half. The universities behave as local monopolies.
Universities can control for the average ability of their students by limiting admissions.
They can for example hold an exam and offer admission only to the students with the best re-
sults. Since individual ability varies between zero and one, individuals with ability 1 will be
offered admission first. Let ai  [0,1] be the ability (or the grade obtained in the entrance
exam) of the last student to whom university i will offer admission. Given the number of ap-
plications (1/2) the limiting grade ai determines the number of admissions Ni  [0,1/2]:




Each of the universities devotes some funds to research (Ri), and “produces” Ni graduates of
equal labour productivity (or quality) qi according to a production function of the form:
qi ai + ti [2]
where ai is the average ability of admitted students and ti = Ti/Ni are the funds the university
devotes to teaching (Ti) per enrolled student (Ni). From [1], we have ai =1–Ni. Although we
are aware of existing synergies between teaching and research at the graduate level, these are
much less obvious within the framework of undergraduate education, where teaching and re-
search are to a large extent mutually exclusive activities. We then concentrate on undergra-
duate education.
The parameters , 0 represent, respectively, the peer effect and the productivity of
teaching per student. Universities care for the increase in total productivity of their students
Ni qi (which provides reputation or prestige) and also derive some utility Ri from time/funds
devoted to research activities Ri · 0 is thus the marginal utility of research. The payoff of
the university is
Ui = Ni qi + Ri
Finally, funds available to universities are provided by the government in the form of a
fixed amount F and a positive per-student allocation s. Per student allocations are widely
used in Europe as a simple way to adjust funding for the relative size of a university. Funds
obtained from the government are entirely devoted to paying the teachers a salary w in ex-
change of which they teach (thus increasing the productivity of the students) and/or research
(providing the institution with higher utility levels). We can normalize the exogenous wage
w to 1 to obtain the simple budget constraint for each university i:
F + sNi  Ti + Ri [3]
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bound to lead to extreme solutions. Hence, we must be ready to interpret our results as mag-
nified tendencies.
The following table summarizes the results corresponding to the existence of student
mobility according to Del Rey (2001). Demand depends on quality and limits feasible
enrolments at each university. Different equilibrium types result depending on the parameter
configuration. The third column collects the effect of marginal increases in the per-student
allocation s paired with the necessary reduction in F required to keep the budget balanced.
When preferences for research are strong and either  the peer group effect, or s the per stu-
dent allocation, are large enough, the government can control resulting levels of research,
teaching and hence education quality by means of the relative weight given to per student al-
locations in the finance scheme.
In absence of student mobility, demand is given. As a result, no interaction takes place
among the institutions. Our problem has then two possible corner solutions. In order to see
this, note that the constraints [2] and [3] are always binding. If they were not, we could al-
ways increase the allocation to research and thus raise the payoff. Hence, we can substitute
qi = ai +  (Ti / Ni) and Ri = F + sNi – Ti into the utility function, which yields:
Ui = Ni (1 – Ni)+(  – ) Ti +  (F + sNi) [4]
This function is increasing in the relevant range of N so that all applications are always ac-
cepted. If  > , [4] is also increasing in T: all funds are devoted to teaching.I f >  , the pay-
off of the university is always decreasing in T so that all funds are devoted to research.S i n c e
demand does not depend on quality, universities still manage to enrol N = 1/2 students. This,
together with the fact that no funds are devoted to teaching, yields minimal (though positive)
quality. The following table represents equilibrium types in absence of student mobility.
We can conclude that, in absence of student mobility, each university will teach full time
at equilibrium if the productivity of teaching is larger than the marginal utility of research
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Table 1
Equilibrium type Conditions Role of Financing Scheme
Full-time T  >  none
Selective T and R  > ,  large 	s 
 less R, more T and q
Mass T and R  > ,  small, s large 	s 
 less R, more T and q
Full-time R  > ,  and s small 	s can change equilibrium type
Table 2
Equilibrium type Conditions Role of Financing Scheme
Full-time T  >  none
Full-time R  >  noneand research full-time otherwise. In both cases, all applications are accepted. Moreover, this
result is independent from the relative weight given to per-student allocations in the pro-
posed funding scheme. Although this may seem trivial, note that, in principle, there is a
trade-off between the costs and benefits of limiting admissions. We could expect universities
to be more or less selective according to the size of per-student allocations even at the mo-
nopolistic case. For example, if per-student allocations were low, the university could reduce
admissions if the associated loss of funds was smaller than the gain in quality obtained
through student selection. We have shown that, in absence of student mobility, she will not
have an interest in doing this.
Indeed, when students are not mobile, the higher quality derived from selection has no
positive effect on demand. For this reason, selection of students will not take place.
3. Concluding remarks
Competition is understood here as strategic interaction between the institutions. When-
ever the model allowing for student mobility (Del Rey, 2001) yields identical results as those
obtained at the local monopoly case, we conclude that competition has no effect at equilib-
rium.
This is the case in equilibrium types number 1 and 4 in the introduction (full-time teach-
ing and full-time research), which yield the exact same outcome as that of the local monopo-
lies case analyzed next. Student mobility, certainly a necessary condition for competition to
take place, is however not enough for it to affect university behaviour. In particular, we also
need that the marginal utility of research is larger than the productivity of teaching ( > ).
Of course, very large preferences for research eliminate teaching and, hence, competition for
students.
In absence of student mobility all students attend their assigned university independently
of the quality provided. When students are mobile, they choose the university that offers the
highest quality. The question is whether universities will try to attract those mobile students
or not. The answer is that they may, provided that they care for research.
The intuition underlying this result is the following. If universities do not care for re-
search, all funds are simply devoted to teaching and all applications are accepted. Caring for
research implies that, if they teach, universities want to make the best out of teaching (mini-
mize costs/maximize benefits). That way, remaining funds will be transferred to research.
Each additional admission then implies a novel trade-off between the additional funds ob-
tained through the per-student allocation and the fall in average ability of students, which
raises the cost of teaching. If peer effects are strong relative to per-student allocations, uni-
versities caring for research are selective. Clearly, as the relative size of per-student alloca-
tions grows, admissions increase.
Hence, when student mobility affects the outcome of university behaviour, the financing
scheme is the ultimate determinant of education quality and research levels (see Propositions
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tition may allow the government to control resulting levels of teaching, education quality and
research by means of a very simple tool: the relative weight of per-student allocations in the
funding scheme. In the context of a simple model we have shown that high preferences for
research are a necessary condition for this to be the case. Empirical work should provide the
evidence required to assess the relevance of this result.
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Resumen
Este trabajo explora, basándose en resultados previos, los efectos de la movilidad de estudiantes sobre el comporta-
miento de las universidades. Los resultados sugieren que, si a las universidades no les preocupa la investigación, no
reaccionarán ante el aumento de competencia cuando los estudiantes pueden elegir dónde estudiar. Además, tampo-
co reaccionarán ante los incentivos proporcionados por el gobierno a través del esquema de financiación. Las prefe-
rencias por la investigación se convierten en un elemento clave del éxito o fracaso de políticas diseñadas para (i) po-
tenciar la competencia en el sector de la educación superior, y (ii) modificar los niveles de investigación y calidad
educativa mediante los incentivos que puede proporcionar el esquema de financiación.
Palabras claves: competencia entre universidades, financiación de la educación superior.
Clasificación JEL: L3, I22.
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